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CObjectives: Risk-sharing is being considered by many health care
systems to address the financial risk associated with the adoption of
new technologies. We explored major stakeholders’ views toward
the potential implementation of a financial risk-sharing mechanism
regarding budget-impact estimates for adding new technologies to
the Israeli National List of Health Services. According to our pro-
posed scheme, health plans will be partially compensated by tech-
nology sponsors if the actual use of a technology is substantially
higher than what was projected and health plans will refund the
government for budgets that were not fully utilized. Methods: By
sing a semi-structured protocol, we interviewed major stakeholders
nvolved in the process of updating the National List of Health Services
N  31). We inquired into participants’ views toward our proposed
isk-sharingmechanism,whether the proposed schemewould achieve
ts purpose, its feasibility of implementation, and their opinion on the
ther stakeholders’ incentives. Results: Participants’ considerations O
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oi:10.1016/j.jval.2012.01.007ere classified into four main areas: financial, administrative/manage-
ial, impact on patients’ health, and influence on public image. Most par-
icipants agreed that the conceptual risk-sharing scheme will improve
he accuracy of early budget estimates and were in favor of the pro-
osed scheme, although Ministry of Finance officials tended to object
o it. Conclusions: The successful implementation of risk-sharing
chemes depends mainly on their perception as a win-win situation
y all stakeholders. The perception exposed by our participants that
isk-sharing can be a tool for improving the accuracy of early budget-
mpact estimates and the challenges pointed by them are relevant to
ther health care systems also and should be considered when im-
lementing similar schemes.
eywords: budget-impact, reimbursement, risk-sharing.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Innovative health technologies pose a substantial financial bur-
den on insurers, patients, and health care systems worldwide.
As a result, several countries have established agencies to de-
termine what technologies provide good value and should be
covered. In response to patients’ and clinicians’ pressure on
governments and reimbursement authorities to accelerate ac-
cess to new and innovative technologies, despite significant un-
certainties surrounding their effectiveness and the budget im-
pact at the time of introduction, several health care systems
have recently implemented various novel approaches, such as
“risk-sharing” mechanisms, to manage these uncertainties. To
balance the technology sponsor’s desire for early market access
with the necessity to ensure effective and efficient use of lim-
ited health care resources, some of the financial risks involved
are shifted from the payer to the technology sponsor. So far,
technologies that have been covered under such agreements
have tended to be for severe indications with great unmet need,
substantial uncertainty about long-term safety and effective-
* Address correspondence to: Ariel Hammerman, Department of H
ox 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel.
E-mail: arielha@clalit.org.il.
098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, Internation
ublished by Elsevier Inc.ness, high cost/budgetary impact, or strong political/patient
lobby demanding access [1].
Adamski et al. [2] suggest two sub-categories of risk-sharing
greements: performance-based and financial-based. Perfor-
ance-based contracts focus on the efficacy of the product and
re designed to ensure that the intervention results in the
romised health improvement. When a pre-specified outcome
s not reached, the cost of the technology is partially or fully
eimbursed to the payer. Financial-based risk-sharing agree-
ents, either price-volume agreements or patient access
chemes, focus on controlling the financial impact of introduc-
ng a new technology and aim to reduce the budget-impact un-
ertainty that is frequently associated with coverage and reim-
ursement decisions. In a typical case, when the total budget
mpact or the amount paid for treating a single patient exceeds
he target that the technology sponsor and the payer agreed
pon, then the technology sponsor is required to reimburse the
ayer. McCabe et al. [3] suggest that these schemes may be
elevant when there is a considerable uncertainty about the size
f the population that will benefit from the technology. Com-
Systems Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O.
ciety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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may be found elsewhere [2–11].
The Process of Updating the National List of Health
Services in the Israeli Health Care System
The health care system in Israel operates under a National Health
Insurance Law where health care is provided by four competing,
not-for-profit health plans. The government allocates the health
budget to the health plans who are obliged to ensure that their
members have access to a benefits package that includes inpatient
services, ambulatory care, pharmaceuticals, and other technolo-
gies (National List of Health Services [NLHS]) [12,13].
Every year since 1998, as part of the annual budgeting process,
the government determines the budget that will be available to
fund new technologies to be added to the NLHS. EachNLHS updat-
ing cycle starts with a call for proposals published at the beginning
of the calendar year by theMinistry of Health (MOH). The pharma-
ceutical and medical device companies or their local distributors
(the technology sponsors) are then required to submit a formal
dossier providing details on the efficacy of the proposed technol-
ogies as well as the projected annual budget needed to fund them.
More recently, a cost-effectiveness analysis presenting a cost per
quality-adjusted life-year ratio is required for proposed technolo-
gies associated with annual costs above 100,000 Shekels (approx-
imately US$30,000) per patient.
The recommendations on which new technologies should be
added to the NLHS are made by an ad hoc Public National Advisory
Committee (PNAC). The PNAC currently includes senior officials
from the MOH, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the health plans, and
representatives of the public at large. The PNAC evaluates all pro-
posed technologies and considers clinical, economic, social, and eth-
ical aspectswhenmaking coveragedecisions. Thisprocess isunique,
as all candidate technologies considered for coverage compete with
eachother for funding.Variousaspectsof theprocessofupdating the
NLHS have been described and scrutinized elsewhere [14–22].
Because of the budget constraint, the estimated budget impact of
each technology plays amajor role in coverage decisions. A subcom-
mittee of representatives from the MOF, the MOH, and the four
health plans provides the PNAC with the anticipated budget impact
of each technology considered. The subcommittee’s figures take into
account the budget projections thatwereprovidedby the technology
sponsors in the formal dossiers, medical experts’ opinion, and inde-
pendent projections provided by the health plans.
Resources allocated annually to health plans for providing the
new technologies remain constant over the subsequent years.
Thus, health plans face a considerable financial risk if the utiliza-
tion is substantially higher than what was projected at the time of
listing. In contrast, when the technology utilization is lower than
what was initially forecasted, the budget saved may be used by
health plans for other purposes.
The two major stakeholders involved in the process of updat-
ing the NLHS may perceive contradicting incentives. Health plans
that face a financial risk if the actual demand exceeds the early
utilization projections are incentivized to overestimate the budget
required to minimize their financial risk once the technology is
reimbursed. In contrast, technology sponsors that are motivated
to receive coverage for their technologies may incorporate in their
dossier submissions conservative estimates on the number of po-
tential users of the new technology and the future budget impact,
thus improving the chances for the technology to be included in
the NLHS. Then, once the new technology is covered, extensive
marketing efforts on the part of technology sponsors will expand
the demand and increase the number of treated patients, render-
ing the allocated budget insufficient.
In a previous article [15],weoutlinedaconceptual framework for
a financial risk-sharingmechanismbetween the Israeli health plans,the government, and the technology sponsors to hedge against un-
certainty in the total budget required for the coverage of the new
technologies. According to thismechanism, health planswill be par-
tially compensated by the sponsors if the actual use of the new tech-
nology is substantially higher thanwhatwas projected. On the other
hand, health plans will partially return funds to the government if
the amount of the newly listed technology utilized is significantly
lower than the early estimates. The refunded budget will then be
reallocated and used for adding additional technologies to the NLHS
in the subsequent updating cycles. The proposed scheme is not a
simple price-volume agreement, because it suggests that in cases in
which the utilization of the technology is lower than the early esti-
mates, the health plans (“the payer”) will need to refund the govern-
ment for unused budgets. We assumed that this risk-sharing model
wouldmotivate both technology sponsors and health care providers
to providemore accurate budget-impact estimates tominimize their
potential financial risk.
In our current study,we explored the views and concerns of the
main stakeholders involved in the NLHS updating process toward
possible implementation of the proposed risk-sharingmechanism
and whether they believed that it would result in a more accurate
budget-impact forecasting, as we hypothesized. We discuss ad-
vantages and disadvantages associated with the adoption of the
proposed risk-sharing arrangement as viewed by the stakeholders
themselves and by their counterparts.
Methods
We used a semistructured interview protocol to conduct inter-
viewswithmajor stakeholders involved in the process of updating
theNLHS andwith leading health policy academic researchers. All
potential interviewees contacted agreed to participate. The inter-
views were conducted in the period between January 2008 and April
2010. Participants included 10 government officials, 8 seniormanag-
ers in the country’s four health plans, 7 pharmaceutical industry
executives, 5 academic researchers, and 1 representative of the Is-
raeliMedicalAssociation.Governmentofficials interviewed included
representatives from theMOHand theMOF,whoplay amajor role in
planning and controlling the health care system. Among all partici-
pants, nine were physicians, eight were registered pharmacists,
eight others were economists, and the reminder had other training.
The majority of participants (25 of 31; 81%) were men.
Government and health plans officialswere chosen because they
were all current or former members of the PNAC or the PNAC sub-
committee, and so were directly involved in the updating process of
theNLHS.Weapproachedpharmaceutical company executiveswho
represented the companieswith thehighest volumeof sales in Israel
that presumably have the largest impact on the Israeli pharmaceu-
tical market. Health policy scholars were selected on the basis of
their research interest in health economics, health technology as-
sessment, and evaluating the process of updating theNLHS in Israel.
We also interviewed one official from the Israel Medical Association.
However, because the Israel Medical Association decided during the
interview period to withdraw from the PNAC deliberations, we ex-
cluded this interview from our final analysis.
We inquired into the interviewee’s views toward our proposed
risk-sharing mechanism: whether the proposed scheme would
achieve itspurpose, its chances for improvingpatients’healthstatus,
feasibility of its implementation, and their opinion on the other
stakeholders’ incentives to accept or to object to it. All interviews
were conducted face to face by the lead author (A.H.) in the partici-
pants’ offices and lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. Subsequent to
receiving an explicit consent, the interviews were audio recorded
and transcribed verbatim. Detailed field notes were written during
and immediately after the interviews. The open-ended questions
askedandanalyzed inour current studyarepresented inAppendixA
in Supplemental Materials found at doi:10.1016/j.jval.2012.01.007.
ll imp
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peated readings of the verbatim transcriptions and interview
notes. Then, detailed descriptions of each interviewee views were
produced. Last, by using the constant comparisonmethod [24], we
synthesized analysis across participants. The trustworthiness of
the studywas ensuredmainly by using three strategies: purposive
sampling of interviewees allowedmaximal range of stakeholder’s
views. Reflexibility was reached by using field notes and thick de-
scriptions of each participant and his or her views. The partici-
pants’ views were classified during peer debriefing sessions
among two of the authors (A.H. and D.G.).
Results
Wefirst asked participants to describe their own considerations in
decidingwhether to support the proposed risk-sharing framework
and then we explored what they believed the other stakeholders’
motivations would be. Participants’ considerations were classified
into four main areas: financial issues, administrative/managerial
matters, possible impact on patients’ health, and influence on
public image (Tables 1–3).
Among health plans’ executives (Table 1), the vast majority of
considerations expressed were financial. There was a consensus
that the newmechanismwould improve the budgetary balance of
the health plans, and so, all health plans’ executives supported
possible adoption of the risk-sharing mechanism. Typical com-
ments expressed by health plans’ executives were as follows:
Table 1 – Health plans’ considerations in favor of and agai
Considerations in favor o
Financial considerations Currently, the health plans a
the financial risk in the cas
The proposed scheme will
risk and budgetary uncerta
The mechanism will improve
impact by all stakeholders.
There will be less cases of ov
the allocated budget.
The scarce allocated resource
will be used more appropri
The budgetary balance of the
Patients’ health considerations It will be possible to cover mo
allocated budget, which wi
Table 2 – Technology sponsors’ considerations in favor of
Considerations in favor of the risk-shari
Financial
considerations
At the bottom line, accepting the agreement will
chances of technologies to be included in the
In the proposed scheme, in case of underutilizat
unused budgets will be used for adding other
the NLHS.
In the current scheme, the situation in which de
health plans budgets because of overuse of ne
not good also for the pharmaceutical industry
Administrative
considerations
The mechanism will create more transparency i
Public image
considerations
Accepting the mechanismwill improve the public
companies that will prove that they stand behinNHLS, National List of Health Services.If I get compensated for excessive use of technologies, I’ll be will-
ing to return any unused budget. (Health plans 6)
The health plans are not seeking tomake profits from the technol-
ogy budgets; all they want is to receive a realistic budget in
order to provide patients’ health needs. (Health plans 3)
The majority of the other stakeholders also believed that the
health plans would support the proposed framework, although
two government officials and two academics suggested that the
health plans’ executives would oppose the mechanism. They
presumed that the health plans would prefer the current prac-
tice in which unused budgets are maintained and used by the
health plans for other purposes and not returned to the govern-
mental budget. One of the academic scholars explained:
The health plans are currently profitable in their technology bud-
gets. The question is not only whether the proposed mecha-
nism is efficient, it is also the status at which you are entering
it. (Academia 4)
Pharmaceutical industry executives mostly supported the concep-
tual risk-sharing framework. Their support was motivated by finan-
cial and administrative incentives and also by a desire to enhance
their public image as contributors to improving population’s
health (Table 2).
The proposed scheme will lessen the financial strain from the
health plans in adopting new technologies. The technology
he proposed risk-sharing mechanism.
risk-sharing mechanism Considerations against the
risk-sharing mechanism
only stakeholders who bear
veruse of new technologies.
ize health plans’ financial
None
arly estimations of budget
of new technologies beyond
new health technologies
.
th plans will improve.
chnologies with the same
rove patients’ health.
None
against the proposed risk-sharing mechanism.
echanism Considerations against the risk-sharing
mechanism
ase the
.
The industry can’t be accountable for prescribing
decisions made by the physicians.
f technologies,
echnologies to
In the proposedmechanism, the risk is only to the
industry. The health plans will always get the
new technologies budget in one way or another.
are caused in
hnologies is
Companies with a short pipeline will not benefit
from other technologies added to the NLHS
from budgets returned by the health plans
whole system. None
e of those
ir estimates.
Nonenst t
f the
re the
e of o
minim
inty.
the e
eruse
s for
ately
heal
re teand
ng m
incre
NLHS
ion o
new t
ficits
w tec
.
n the
imag
d the
740 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 7 3 7 – 7 4 2sponsors are eager to sell. When the health plans are in deficit,
it is a bad situation also for the industry. (Sponsors 7)
There is no doubt that the industry will benefit from the risk-
sharing scheme. On the bottom line—we will sell more, which
would be good for patients too. (Sponsors 3)
Only one technology sponsor opposed the proposed risk-sharing
arrangement and explained:
The industry cannot be accountable for overuse of new pharma-
ceuticals. The rate of consumption is determinedmainly by th.
prescribing physicians that are not part of the proposed
scheme. Another major problem is that the planned risk-shar-
ing mechanism is not balanced: the pharmaceutical company
may lose money, while for the health plans—resources that
they return to government in case of underconsumption will
be returned to them to fund other technologies. Overall, the
health plans will not lose anything. (Sponsors 2)
Most other stakeholders assumed that the possible loss of profits
from the part of the industrywill cause the technology sponsors to
widely oppose the proposed model:
In principle, I assume that no technology sponsor will support the
proposed risk-sharing scheme, but it will actually depend on
the mechanism’s exact parameters. (Academia 1)
In a risk-sharingmechanism thepharmaceutical companieswould
losemore than benefit. As an industrialist, I would not buy it. (MOH 6)
The Industry is the problematic part in the model; they have
the least interest to support it. The nature of the industry is to sell
as much as possible and get the most profit. Here we are telling
themnot to engage inmaximummarketing efforts—and that they
have to return money to the health plans!. (Health plans 3)
Among government officials, the MOF decision-makers tended to
object to the proposed mechanism. The reasons for objection
were mainly financial and administrative (Table 3). For exam-
ple, one of the officials expressed his concerns as follows:
Thescenario that Iamafraidof is that if, asa resultof implementing the
risk-sharingscheme,wewill discover that there isa realoverutiliza-
tionof the technology, therewill beademand fromthegovernment
Table 3 – Government officials’ considerations in favor of a
Considerations in favor of the risk-sh
mechanism
Financial
considerations
The risk-sharing agreement bears no risk on
government. The total budget does not ch
The agreement will bring a more rational us
the health budget.
If unused budgets will be returned by the he
plans and used for other technologies, th
health system will produce more quality-
adjusted life-years for the same funds.
The agreement will lead to more accuracy in
estimates of the technology’s budget imp
Administrative
considerations
The mechanism will create more transparen
technology utilization in the health care s
Patients’ health
considerations
It will be possible to reimburse more techno
with the same allocated budget, which w
improve patients’ health.to compensate the health planswith extra funds. (MOF 1)The government is not a goodnegotiatorwith the health plans and
the pharmaceutical companies on retrospective reimbursement.
Additional bureaucracy would hurt everyone. There will be an in-
sanity of reimbursement and mutual claims. (MOF 1)
Their counterparts in the MOH usually supported the scheme, but
they believed the pharmaceutical industry will object to this
agreement. The pros from the MOH view were financial and
administrative, but they also related to the possible improve-
ment in patients’ health status (Table 3):
The MOH’s interest is that the NLHS will be as broad as possible.
(MOH 4)
If one can expand the NLHS, without increasing the resources—
then why not be supportive? (MOH 6)
The interviewees responded also to three questions regarding the
theoretical benefits of actually adopting the risk-sharing scheme
and whether it would be possible to implement such a mecha-
nism. Most participants thought that the mechanism would be
beneficial if implemented andwould indeed improve the accuracy
of early budget-impact estimations, but there was a lot of skepti-
cism on whether it can actually work out (Table 4).
A number of interviewees pointed out the low level of trust
among the different stakeholders as a major obstacle in the pos-
sible implementation of the proposed framework. This concern
was expressed by all stakeholders. For example, technology spon-
sors suggested the following:
Although theworld is starting to get used to risk-sharing schemes,
implementing such a mechanism will require a high grade of
trust among all stakeholders, which currently is not the situa-
tion in Israel. (Sponsors 6)
Similar concerns were expressed by participants from the
MOF, academia, and health plans:
At this time, the level of trust within the health system is terrible;
I do not see how it can work. (MOF 1)
The necessary condition for the government to agree to imple-
ment such a mechanism is that they will have full access to all
technology consumption data. Otherwise they will be afraid of
“deals” between the health plans and the technology sponsors.
gainst the proposed risk-sharing mechanism.
Considerations against the risk-sharing
mechanism
.
y
There is an indirect risk on the government. If it is known
that the actual use of the new technology is
significantly higher than projected, there will be a
demand to the government to allocate extra funds.
The agreement might allow manipulations between the
health plans and the industry against the government.
The scheme will actually be “cream sharing” and not
“risk-sharing.”
n The agreement will change the status quo in the system.
The mechanism is now in a reasonable equilibrium;
why introduce “noise” in the system?
The regulator does not know how and is unwilling to deal
technically with such mechanisms. Enforcing refunds
will create an accounting bureaucracy.
s Nonend a
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741V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 7 3 7 – 7 4 2All stakeholders strive for fewer uncertainties in the health care
system. Risk-sharing is a good idea, but not so simple to imple-
ment. We need to initiate immediately a dialogue process be-
tween all stakeholders. With good willing of all parties, and if
all parties will recognize that the proposed scheme fits with
their interests, risk-sharing will be applicable. (Health plans 3)
Discussion
We explored the views and concerns of the major stakeholders in
the Israeli health care system toward the implementation of a
conceptual financial risk-sharing scheme. In Israel, the PNAC will
usually recommend including new technologies in the NLHS only
if the evidence on efficacy and effectiveness is sufficient and con-
vincing. The major uncertainty in the NLHS update decision pro-
cess relates to the actual budget required for reimbursing the
listed technologies. Therefore, our proposed risk-sharing frame-
work does not deal with the clinical performance of a specific
technology, but rather with the total budget utilized, once covered
and reimbursed, and its correspondence with the predefined allo-
cated budget, determined by early budget-impact estimates.
Despite the growing use of risk-sharing arrangements and
their intuitive appeal to policymakers and health care payers,
there are only few academic publications on this topic. Recently,
Stafinski et al. [4] reviewed the literature on stakeholders’ opinions
on perceived advantages and disadvantages of risk-sharing and
“access with evidence development” schemes. They found that all
stakeholders (e.g., technology sponsors, patients, providers, and
payers) seemed to share the view that these schemes offer the
potential to facilitate patient access to promising new technologies
while ensuring effective use of scarce health care resources, al-
though this information was sparse and mainly represented “gray”
literature publications. To the best of our knowledge, stakeholders’
opinionsonusing risk-sharingas a tool for improving theaccuracyof
budget-impact estimations have not been examined yet.
In our study, we found that most interviewees agreed that the
conceptual risk-sharing scheme would indeed improve early bud-
get estimates. All participants from health plans and most tech-
nology sponsors supported the proposed risk-sharing agreement.
The health plans’ support was quite obvious to most participants
because health plans are currently the only stakeholderswho bear
the financial risk in the case of overuse of newly listed technolo-
gies. On the other hand, the technology sponsors’ support of the
roposed scheme was not apparent to many of the other partici-
ants, because of the potential loss of profits from the part of the
ndustry. The main sponsors’ considerations in supporting the
cheme were related to their desire to enhance their chances of ob-
aining market access for their products, which would usually out-
eigh the financial risk inherent in the risk-sharing mechanism.
Recent developments in the process of updating the NLHS in
Israel suggest thatMOH,MOF, and health plans officials, as well as
technology sponsors, became supportive toward exploring the ac-
Table 4 – Additional feasibility questions.
Health plans
Mechanism will achieve its purpose Yes 6
No 1
No answer 1
Mechanism will improve patients’
health status
Yes 7
No 0
No answer 1
Mechanism is possible to
implement
Yes 6
No 2
No answer 0tual feasibility of budget-impact risk-sharing agreements. In prep-aration to the deliberations on the 2011 NLHS update, the MOH
decided for the first time to suggest a risk-sharing agreement re-
garding the budget allocated for the drug sapropterin dihydrochlo-
ride (Kuvan, Merck Serono S.A., Geneva) indicated for patients
with phenylketonuria. According to this 3-year agreement, in the
caseof overuseof thedrug, thefinancial riskwill be fully shifted from
health plans to the technology sponsor. This current arrangement is
somehow different from the conceptual scheme proposed in our
study; “to keep it simple,” the health plans are not required to refund
the government if the actual number of patients will be lower than
projected.
Our conceptual risk-sharing proposal was presented to the de-
cision-makers in theMOH and theMOF as part of the interviewing
process but as to date (October 2011), government officials have
not decided yet whether further schemes will be suggested and
implemented and, if yes, what would be the exact mechanism.
Our study has several limitations that relate mainly to the se-
lection of participants. We used a purposive sampling technique
to approach various stakeholders that have a vast interest in the
process of updating the NLHS in Israel. Among technology spon-
sors, we chose to interview those representing the largest phar-
maceutical companies in Israel, because we believed that these
technology sponsors have the largest impact on the pharmaceu-
tical market in Israel. Although these executives were supportive
of our proposed risk-sharing mechanism, it is possible that man-
agers of smaller pharmaceutical companieswould have expressed
different opinions than those revealed in our study. Nevertheless,
because we did not observe a substantial variability in responses
of participants from the various pharmaceutical companies, we
believe that their viewsmay be representative of the entire indus-
try in Israel. Moreover, we did not interview executives frommed-
ical device companies, because the vast majority of technologies
considered for inclusion in theNLHS are pharmaceuticals.We also
did not approach patient advocate groups; although patients may
benefit from risk-sharing agreement, their current influence on
decisions made by the PNAC is very limited.
Another limitation of the current study is that we did not pres-
ent explicitly the mechanism in detail; what are the stakeholders’
tolerance limits? What level of use would constitute overuse or
underuse that would trigger a payment on the part of the sponsor,
or a rebate by health plans? How much should be the rebate? It is
also conceivable that technology sponsors may seek different tol-
erance levels for their different products. These issuesmaywell be
a sticking point and as such were beyond the scope of the current
study. To address these and other issues that rose from our qual-
itative analysis, we are currently exploring a mathematical model
using a game theory approach thatmay providemore quantitative
answers to some of these concerns.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that our study
is the first to shed light on stakeholders’ opinions on a potential
risk-sharing agreement meant to improve the accuracy of bud-
get-impact estimations. Furthermore, our analysis has some
Government Industry Academia
Yes 7 Yes 6 Yes 2
No 2 No 1 No 2
No answer 1 No answer 0 No answer 1
Yes 7 Yes 6 Yes 4
No 1 No 1 No 0
No answer 2 No answer 0 No answer 1
Yes 2 Yes 4 Yes 1
No 7 No 3 No 2
No answer 1 No answer 0 No answer 2important policy implications; Our study revealed that most
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742 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 7 3 7 – 7 4 2stakeholders assume that risk sharing will, in fact, improve the
accuracy of early budget-impact estimates and that although
intuitively technology sponsors should object to risk-sharing, in
reality they would generally support such a budget-impact
scheme.
It should be emphasized that when implementing such a
scheme, stakeholders’ acceptance of themodel and their provided
budget-impact estimates would actually depend on the numerical
parameters and tolerance levels imposed in the mechanism. In
this regard, Zaric and O’Brein [25] suggest that even with a risk-
haring scheme in place, it may be optimal for the budget-impact
nalysis provider to over- or underestimate total drug expendi-
ures; they have shown that manufacturer’s optimal projections
ary in the unit price, the unit cost, and the rebate proportion.
urther studies that will bring to light the optimal behaviors of
arties engaged in risk-sharing agreements are warranted.
As revealed in our interviews, the success of implementing a
isk-sharing mechanism depends mainly on a high grade of trust
nd collaboration among all stakeholders. Although all parties
trive for fewer uncertainties in the health care system, when in-
roducing a risk-sharing scheme it is essential to prove to all par-
ies that the proposed framework is a win-win arrangement. If all
takeholders will recognize that the proposed scheme fits with
heir interests, risk-sharing would be applicable.
Conclusions
Uncertainties regarding the total financial consequences associ-
ated with listing a technology on a national or a health plan for-
mulary exist in all health care systems. While the listing makes a
drug available for prescribing, it cannot determine the total de-
mand because treatment recommendations are made and in-
duced almost solely by practicing clinicians. Implementing a risk-
sharing mechanism on the budget impact, as suggested in our
study, may help in reducing these uncertainties.
Risk-sharing schemes will most likely continue to emerge in
many health care systems. The success of implementing a risk-
sharing mechanism depends mainly on its perception as a win-
win situation for all stakeholders involved. The challenges pointed
out by participants in this study regarding the adoption of a risk-
sharing schememay be relevant to other health care systems and
are essential when considering the plausibility for its implemen-
tation. We recommend that decision-makers consider the differ-
ent stakeholders’ perceptions exposed in our study that, in many
cases, could be relevant when implementing similar or different
types of risk-sharing schemes in other health care systems.
Source of financial support: The study was partially supported
by a research scholarship from The Israel National Institute for
Health Policy and Health Services Research.
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